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Chandler: National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731 (1st Cir

National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham,
43 F.3D 731 (1ST CIR. 1995).
INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff-appellant, National Amusements, Inc. ("National"), owner of a movie
theater showing "midnight movies" brought this action against the Town of
Dedham ("Dedham"), in response to Dedham's promulgation of an ordinance
prohibiting licensed activities from taking place between the hours of one a.m.
and six a.m. National's constitutional challenge alleged that the ordinance was,
inter alia, violative of the First Amendment. The United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment for the Town of
Dedham, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
FACTS
National is the owner and operator of Showcase Cinemas, a movie theater
complex located in Dedham, Massachusetts. Prior to this action, National had
shown "midnight movies," i.e., movies scheduled to begin between 11:30 p.m.
and 12:30 a.m., on Friday and Saturday nights. After several years, Dedham
voiced concern about the secondary effects' of exhibiting movies at such hours.
Thus, after much effort, Dedham promulgated Article Four, banning the occurrence of licensed activities between one and six a.m. Immediately thereafter, National challenged Article Four.2
LEGAL ANALYSIS

National's constitutional challenge alleged that Article Four violated the First
Amendment and due process, placed an unconstitutional condition on National's
entertainment license, and violated the overbreadth doctrine.3 Recognizing that
entertainment falls within the meaning of speech and, therefore, is entitled to the
full protection of the First Amendment,4 the court initially dealt with the different standards of review applicable to First Amendment challenges.

1. Specifically, Dedham was concerned about traffic and security problems which accompanied
National's showing of midnight movies.
2. Article Four reads as follows: "[ulnless otherwise restricted, no holder of a license issued by
the Town of Dedham, pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 140, Sections 177A, 181 and
183A, shall permit any activity licensed thereunder to be conducted between the hours of 1:00 a.m.
and 6:00 am." National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 734-35 (1st Cir. 1995).
Sections 177A, 181 and 183A of chapter 140 of the Massachusetts General Laws, "authorizes municipalities... to grant and revoke licenses for amusement devices, concerts, dances, exhibitions, and
public shows for which an admission fee is charged." Id. at 735.
3. This summary only encompasses the First Amendment claim.
4. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
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The court made the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
regulations as the basis for distinguishing between strict and intermediate levels
of review. In instances where a regulation differentiates on the basis of the
expression's content, i.e., where the "regulation[] suppress[es], disadvantage[s],
5
or impose[s] differential burdens on speech because of its content," the regulation is subject to the "most exacting scrutiny," and is considered "presumptively
invalid."7 Conversely, if a regulation burdens speech but is "unrelated to the
speaker's viewpoint or to the content of the proscribed speech ... less taxing,
(but nonetheless meaningful)"' scrutiny is applied.9
Rejecting National's claims that Article Four was content-based and
"impermissibly single[d] out"'" National as being subject to regulation, the court
concluded that strict scrutiny was not warranted. The first step in reaching such
conclusion required the court to assess whether Article Four was content-based.
The determination of whether a regulation is content-neutral, turns on "whether
the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with
the message it conveys."" In making such a determination, the court must recognize that the regulation does not have to explicitly indicate a preferred viewpoint to be content-based; a regulation which "prohibit[s] ...public discussion
2
of an entire topic" violates the First Amendment. However, "[a] regulation
that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral,
even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others."' 3 Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that Article Four was not a
content-based regulation due to the fact that applicability of the ordinance necessarily depended on whether the activity was licensed under the relevant state
laws. Additionally, the court's decision was bolstered by the fact that National
was not precluded from showing the same movies at different times of the day.
The court further concluded that National erroneously relied on City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 4 as support for National's proposition that
the ordinance's distinction between licensed and non-licensed activities was
discriminatory as to the secondary effects of permissible expression on the basis

5. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994).
6. Id.
7. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992). For a regulation to survive strict
scrutiny, it must serve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. Arkansas Writers' Project Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
8. National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 736 (lst Cir. 1995).
9. This level of judicial scrutiny falls between rational and strict scrutiny and is commonly
known as "intermediate" scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, regulations with respect to the time,
place or manner of protected expression are constitutionally acceptable if they are not content-based,
are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest and alternative means for communicating the proscribed message are available. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
10. National Amusements,43 F.3d at 737.
11. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
12. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980).
13. Ward,491 U.S. at 791.
14. 113 S.Ct. 1505 (1993).
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of whether an admission fee was assessed. Explaining that "an ordinance aimed
solely at the secondary effects of protected speech ... may nevertheless be...
content-based if the municipality differentiates between speakers for reasons
unrelated to the legitimate interests that prompted the regulation,"' 5 the court
concluded that Dedham's distinction between licensed and non-licensed activities
was rationally related to the interests articulated for the promulgation of Article
Four. 6 Thus, the court found that Article Four was not content-based.
The court next addressed National's other claim that it had been singled out
for disparate treatment, thus requiring application of strict scrutiny. Setting out
the recognized standards in instances of "singling out," the court noted the holdings in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue" and
Leathers v. Medlock. 8 In Minneapolis Star, the Supreme Court asserted that
"differential treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic of the
press, suggests that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of
expression, and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional."' 9 Furthermore,
in Leathers v. Medlock, the Supreme Court defined when a regulation which
involves targeting is subject to strict scrutiny, finding it appropriate in instances
when the regulation "(1) single[s] out the press, (2) take[s] aim at a small group
of speakers, or (3) discriminate[s] on the basis of the content of protected
speech. 20
Likening the instant case to Leathers more so than to Minneapolis Star, the
court concluded that National was not singled out for differential treatment by
Article Four. The court drew this conclusion based on evidence that Article Four
was part of a larger scheme to prevent commercial activities encroaching on
residents' privacy. Additionally, the court found that the secondary effects Article
Four sought to limit, i.e., noise and traffic, were special characteristics that justified differential treatment.2' Rejecting National's arguments that Article Four
was content-based and targeted National for disparate treatment, the court concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review.
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that Article Four was
constitutionally permissible. Rejecting National's contentions that Dedham's
interest in the "preserv[ation of] peace and tranquility" was illusory or racially

15. National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 738 (1st Cir. 1995) (discussing
the Supreme Court's holding in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.).
16. This conclusion was largely premised on the holding in Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City of
Boston, 652 F.2d 1115, 1121 n.6 (1st Cir. 1981), in which the court found it reasonable for a legislative body to conclude that differential treatment is appropriate because of the limited probability of
harm posed by non-commercial ventures.
17. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
18. 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
19. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 585.
20. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447.
21. The court's conclusion was based on the Supreme Court's acknowledgment in Minneapolis
Star that "certain forms of differential treatment may be 'justified by some special characteristic' of
the regulated speaker." National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 740 (1st Cir.
1995) (citing MinneapolisStar, 460 U.S. at 585).
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motivated, the court held Dedham's interests to be significant.' Additionally,
the court recognized that "narrowly tailored" does not require the least restrictive
means, rather only that the "substantial government interest... would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation."' The court found that Article
Four was sufficiently narrowly drawn because it served to promote Dedham's
interest in preserving tranquility, and moreover, based on Dedham's past experi4
ences, such interest could not be effectively achieved without such regulation.
Finally, the court held that there were adequate alternative means for communicating the message available, relying primarily on the fact that the ban only
precluded the exhibition of movies during five hours of the day and, furthermore,
that National was not precluded from exhibiting the same materials at other times
of the day.
CONCLUSION

In response to National's First Amendment challenge to Dedham's ordinance
restricting the exhibition of "midnight movies," the First Circuit concluded that
the ordinance was neither content-based nor singled out National for differential
treatment. Based on the foregoing conclusion, the court determined that application of intermediate scrutiny was appropriate. The court determined that Article
Four was content-neutral, served a substantial governmental interest, and provided for alternative means of communication, and therefore, was constitutional.
The First Circuit, therefore, concluded that summary judgment in favor of the
Town of Dedham was proper. Thus, in light of the court's holding, towns may
constitutionally regulate the times that certain activities, such as the showing of
movies, may be conducted.
Lisa M. Chandler

22. The Town of Dedham enacted Article 4 following several town meetings during which residents expressed concerns about traffic and security problems, notwithstanding National's offer to
undertake measures at its own expense to ameliorate such problems.
23. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
24. The court further resolved that such conclusion was no less valid because Article 4 was "general[ly] applicable to all licensed entertainment." National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43
F.3d 731, 744 (lst Cir. 1995).
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